
The relationship between Narendra Modi and S. Jaishankar began long before either man occupied his current position. It took shape in Beijing, in the years when Modi was chief minister of Gujarat and Jaishankar was India’s ambassador to China.
From 2009 to 2013, Jaishankar was posted in Beijing. Modi visited China several times during those years, promoting Gujarat as an investment destination and cultivating relationships with Chinese business leaders. Their meetings were not merely ceremonial. According to former foreign minister Yashwant Sinha, the two men began building an association that would later prove valuable to both.
“There are things diplomats do as an ambassador, but there is always a little extra that you can do,” Sinha said. “If you are worldly wise you will do that little extra in order to ingratiate yourself.”
An Indian journalist who was based in Beijing at the time recalled that Jaishankar organised an informal meeting between Modi and Indian journalists at the ambassador’s residence. He also helped Modi establish important business contacts.
इस खोजी आलेख को हिंदी में पढ़ने के लिए क्लिक करें।
During Modi’s visit to China in November 2011, the Gujarat chief minister made a pitch for “Brand Gujarat” to prominent Chinese investors. He urged them to invest in the state’s power and infrastructure projects and invited them to the Vibrant Gujarat summit scheduled for 2013. Jaishankar and other embassy officials accompanied him to meetings with prospective investors.

The relationship did not go unnoticed in Gujarat’s business circles.
“Jaishankar kept the two traditional rivals, India and China, on cordial terms,” said Pathik Patwari, president of the Gujarat Chamber of Commerce and Industry. “He was always warm, resourceful and available for industrialists who wanted to expand their trade with China.”
Modi and Jaishankar appear to have made an impression on each other. More importantly, they developed trust.
Years later, Jaishankar himself recalled his first encounter with Modi as “different and unusual”. What struck him was the chief minister’s interest in India’s security and economic interests in relation to China. He also remembered Modi’s concern for three Gujarati citizens who were imprisoned in China at the time.
Looking back, Jaishankar credited Modi with changing the character of Indian foreign policy.
“He has really led a foreign policy which is much more security-focused,” Jaishankar said. “He has practiced diplomacy which is more development-focused. He has created people-centric policies in foreign policy.”
It is impossible to know whether Jaishankar, during those early meetings in Beijing, imagined Modi as a future prime minister.
“He definitely saw him as a political leader of India and wanted to have bridges with him,” Former Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha said. “And why not? When you are posted abroad, you get these opportunities in plenty. Important Indians come and you wine them, dine them and make friends.”
Jaishankar’s efforts did not disappear from Modi’s memory. “Modi never forgot that ambassador who pushed Gujarat’s business delegation agenda,” said B.R. Muthu Kumar, a former diplomat who knew Jaishankar from their days at Jawaharlal Nehru University.
That relationship would become increasingly important after Modi entered national politics.
From diplomat to Modi’s foreign-policy lieutenant
When Modi became prime minister in 2014, Jaishankar was already one of India’s most experienced diplomats. A 1977-batch Indian Foreign Service officer, he had served as ambassador to China and the United States and had held several of the service’s most influential positions.
His appointment as foreign secretary in January 2015 was striking. Modi superseded the incumbent foreign secretary, Sujatha Singh, before the end of her term and brought Jaishankar into the post.
His reputation had grown further during his tenure as ambassador to the United States. During Modi’s highly publicised visit to America in September 2014, Jaishankar was among the officials who helped make the trip a diplomatic success.
Then came an episode that, according to people familiar with the period, demonstrated how effectively Jaishankar could translate Modi’s ambitions into diplomatic results.
In early 2015, Modi was reportedly unhappy with the proposed list of foreign dignitaries for India’s Republic Day celebrations. “Koi khas mehman nahin hain?”—“Is there no special guest?”—he was said to have asked.
At the time, Barack Obama was still president of the United States, and the possibility of bringing him to India was a major diplomatic prize.
According to journalist Seema Sirohi, Jaishankar, then ambassador in Washington, went to the White House and sought to persuade a senior Obama adviser that a presidential visit to India would be historic. He even showed videos of the Republic Day parade on his phone.
It worked.
Obama became the chief guest at India’s Republic Day celebrations in January 2015.
“He read his mind and gave him Obama,” Muthu Kumar said. “Any PM would love to have him.”
For Modi, the appointment of Jaishankar as foreign secretary soon afterwards was more than the elevation of a talented diplomat. It placed a trusted figure at the centre of the government’s foreign-policy machinery.
Jaishankar was due to retire in January 2018, when he reached the normal retirement age for an IFS officer. But shortly before his retirement, the government amended the service rules to allow the foreign secretary to receive an extension of up to one year.
Jaishankar received that extension and remained in office until 2017.
The bigger promotion came in 2019.
After Modi and the BJP returned to power with a large majority, Jaishankar was appointed external affairs minister, succeeding Sushma Swaraj. He became the first former foreign secretary to hold the position.
A little over a month later, he was elected to the Rajya Sabha from Gujarat on a BJP ticket. Jaishankar has since described himself as an “honorary Gujarati since 2019”.
His rise was extraordinary: diplomat, ambassador, foreign secretary and finally cabinet minister. But it also revealed something about Modi’s style of government—the importance of personal trust in the making of foreign policy.
The Modi-Jaishankar system
Jaishankar’s elevation coincided with a broader transformation in the way foreign policy was being conducted under Modi.

Foreign policy in India has always been highly centralised. Prime ministers have traditionally exercised considerable influence over relations with major powers, neighbouring countries and questions of national security. But critics of the Modi government argue that the concentration of power has gone further, with the Prime Minister’s Office and the national-security establishment playing an increasingly dominant role.
Several diplomats interviewed for this account described the foreign ministry as having less autonomy than in previous governments.
China policy, for instance, is heavily influenced by the China Study Group, an informal body of senior officials. Although the foreign secretary traditionally plays an important role, the group has in recent years been associated closely with National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.
Other sensitive relationships—including those involving Pakistan, Russia, Afghanistan and Myanmar—are also heavily influenced by the national-security establishment.
Soon after Jaishankar became foreign minister, Modi elevated the position of national security adviser to the rank of cabinet minister. Doval was retained in the position and given a prominent place in the government’s security architecture alongside Jaishankar, Home Minister Amit Shah, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman.
This has produced a division of labour that critics describe in simple terms: Doval works behind the scenes, while Jaishankar explains the government’s foreign policy to the world.
“Mr Jaishankar seems to be more of a courier person than policy-maker in India,” Nepali writer and editor Kanak Mani Dixit said. In his view, the Ministry of External Affairs increasingly carries out the bidding of the PMO, where major decisions are made by Modi, Shah and Doval.
Former diplomat M.K. Bhadrakumar sees a broader institutional change. “The picture one gets today is that MEA is transforming and functioning more like, say, the Chinese foreign ministry, where policies are imbued with the ruling party’s ideology,” he said.
He described the change as subtle but significant, particularly because the Indian Foreign Service had traditionally prided itself on professional autonomy.
Scholar Kira Huju, writing about Indian diplomacy in the era of Hindu nationalism, has similarly argued that career diplomats face a “double bind”. They must navigate a political ideology that challenges some of the traditions that shaped the foreign service after independence, while also adapting to a new conception of Indian diplomatic identity.
From consensus to a more partisan foreign policy
The transformation is not limited to the bureaucracy.

India’s foreign policy was once more deliberately presented as a national project, with successive governments seeking at least some degree of political consensus on major international questions.
Salman Khurshid, a former external-affairs minister, recalled a system in which opposition parties were routinely consulted.
“Foreign policy was always a shared idea that everybody contributed to,” Khurshid said. “We used to have all-party consultations. Whether you finally agreed or not, it started with discussion.”
There were precedents for bringing political opponents into diplomatic efforts. In 1994, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao chose BJP leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee to lead India’s delegation to the Human Rights Council. During the East Bengal crisis, Indira Gandhi sent Jayaprakash Narayan abroad to make India’s case.
Critics say Modi has been less inclined towards such bipartisan diplomacy, including during the Russia-Ukraine war.
Yet former officials caution against overstating Jaishankar’s personal power. P.S. Raghavan, a former diplomat and chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, described the system as ultimately centred on one decision-maker.
I asked him whether Jaishankar or Doval had greater influence.
“Actually, one person takes the final decision,” he said. “It is neither a Jaishankar doctrine nor a Doval doctrine. It is the Modi doctrine.”
That assessment is consistent with Sinha’s observation that every Indian prime minister has been deeply involved in foreign policy. The difference, critics argue, lies in how much institutional space remains between the prime minister and the final decision.
The China test
The relationship between Modi and Jaishankar is perhaps most clearly tested by China.
In August 2019, after the Modi government revoked Article 370 and reorganised Jammu and Kashmir, Home Minister Amit Shah declared in Parliament that Aksai Chin—a territory administered by China but claimed by India—was part of Jammu and Kashmir.
Beijing objected and warned New Delhi to be cautious in its words and actions.
Jaishankar was dispatched to Beijing.
His message was designed to reassure the Chinese government that India’s decision was an internal matter and did not alter its external boundaries or the Line of Actual Control.
“There was no implication for the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control with China,” Jaishankar said. “India was not raising any additional territorial claims.”
He also told Chinese officials that the decision concerning Article 370 was “an internal matter of India”.
The following year, the relationship entered a far more dangerous phase.
In 2020, Indian and Chinese troops clashed in the Galwan Valley in Ladakh. Indian soldiers were killed—the first such deaths in the India-China border dispute since the 1962 war.
The crisis created one of the most difficult tests of Modi’s foreign policy.
The government has maintained that it responded firmly, moved troops to the border and pressured China to de-escalate. Jaishankar has repeatedly defended that position.
“If we were indifferent to China, who sent the Indian Army to the border?” he asked critics. “If we were indifferent to China, then why are we pressuring China for de-escalation and disengagement today?”
He has also argued that India-China relations cannot be considered normal while the border remains unsettled.
The deportation of Indian citizens from the United States in February 2025 exposed an uncomfortable weakness in India’s foreign policy. When 104 Indians were flown back to India on a US military aircraft, many were reportedly handcuffed and shackled during the journey. The images were humiliating—not simply for those being deported, but for a country that routinely presents itself as an emerging global power.
But critics contend that the government’s description of disengagement as a resolution obscures a more difficult reality: that Chinese forces have retained positions and that India has, in some areas, accepted a new status quo.
That has created a particularly awkward political problem for Jaishankar. The man presented as the architect and public face of Modi’s assertive foreign policy must also defend the government’s handling of the most serious military crisis with China in decades.
And there is another contradiction.
Even as Modi and Jaishankar have projected a tougher posture towards Beijing, India’s economic relationship with China has remained substantial. Bilateral trade rose by more than 40 per cent in the year after the Ladakh crisis, reaching $125.62 billion, and climbed further to $135.98 billion in 2022.
The contrast captures the central tension in Modi’s foreign policy: strategic competition and economic dependence can exist at the same time.
The man who understands what the master wants
Jaishankar’s rise, ultimately, is inseparable from Modi’s political style.
The prime minister has built a foreign policy that places a premium on national security, economic interests, personal diplomacy and a carefully managed global image. At home, Modi’s politics is closely associated with muscular nationalism and Hindu pride. Abroad, his government presents India through the language of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam—the idea that the world is one family.
Critics see this as part of a broader project of reshaping India’s national identity, including a sustained attack on the political and intellectual legacy of Jawaharlal Nehru and institutions associated with the post-independence order. They argue that the government’s foreign policy is increasingly shaped by the ideological priorities of the BJP and the RSS.
S. Jaishankar appears to have reduced the broad responsibilities of the external affairs minister to the role of an effective spokesperson and “perception manager.” He often speaks more like a spokesperson or the chairman of a debating society. But this is not an Oxford or JNU debating society, where the objective is simply to win debating points. He is India’s foreign minister, carrying a responsibility towards 1.4 billion people.
He may be effective at defending India’s position on international platforms and scoring points in public debates. But the real responsibility of a foreign minister is not merely to protect the government’s image. It is to safeguard India’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests, and long-term security and prosperity.
From this perspective, Jaishankar has been accused of working within a prime minister-centric decision-making system rather than independently assessing or challenging government policies. This appears to have weakened the institutional role of the Ministry of External Affairs and raised questions about the extent of his independence in important foreign-policy decisions.
Critics argue that personal ambition and political office have taken precedence over his professional principles. As an experienced diplomat and former foreign secretary, he was expected to play a more independent, institutional and national-interest-oriented role. Instead, his performance has at times appeared to be reduced to promoting the government’s achievements and responding to its critics.
His foreign-policy record has also come under scrutiny. Serious questions remain about India’s strategy and influence in matters involving China, including the border and disputes over Indian territory, as well as in relation to Iran, Afghanistan and Myanmar. Similarly, balancing between Russia and the West may offer immediate strategic advantages, but the larger question is whether this approach is creating sufficient security and strategic independence for India in the long term.
The Ukraine crisis is another example cited by critics. They argue that the Ministry of External Affairs appeared to play a relatively limited role in the evacuation of Indian students, while the efforts made after the crisis were promoted more prominently for political effect. This raises the question of whether political perception is being given greater importance in foreign policy than actual crisis management and outcomes.
Ultimately, the criticism is not that Jaishankar is an unsuccessful diplomat or an ineffective communicator. He may well be a highly accomplished diplomat and an influential public speaker. But his success as foreign minister should not be measured simply by his ability to win arguments or shape India’s international image.
The real test should be how effectively he has protected India’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, strategic autonomy, democratic values and the long-term interests of Indian citizens. It is against this standard, critics argue, that Jaishankar has fallen short of fully discharging his constitutional and national responsibilities.
Supporters, by contrast, see the same transformation differently: as an attempt to replace what they regard as an outdated diplomatic establishment with a more confident, security-conscious and nationally assertive India.
Jaishankar sits at the centre of that transformation.
He is neither simply the government’s foreign-policy strategist nor merely its spokesman. His influence comes partly from his unusual ability to understand the prime minister’s instincts and translate them into diplomatic language.
That ability was visible in Beijing, when he helped a Gujarat chief minister cultivate Chinese investors. It was visible in Washington, when he helped bring Barack Obama to New Delhi. And it is visible today, when he stands before Parliament, foreign governments and the international media to explain some of the Modi government’s most contentious decisions.
The relationship that began with a chief minister visiting China and an ambassador making introductions has evolved into one of the most consequential partnerships in Indian politics.
Jaishankar may not be the person who makes every foreign-policy decision. By the assessment of former officials, that authority ultimately rests with Modi.
But Jaishankar has become the person who gives those decisions a diplomatic voice.
And perhaps that is why his extraordinary journey—from India’s ambassador in Beijing to foreign secretary and then foreign minister—tells us as much about Narendra Modi as it does about S. Jaishankar.
Source: The Caravan Magazine and
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